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Abstract
In this paper is presented the new modelling framework combining the repli-
cator dynamics (which is the standard model of the frequency dependent selec-
tion) with the Leslie Matrix model of the age-structured population. Firstly the
continuous version of the discrete Leslie Matrix model is derived. It is shown
that Euler–Lotka equation is satisfied when new model reaches the steady state
(ie. stable related frequencies between the age classes). Due to the long expected
lifespan of an individual in comparison with the ecological timescale, the real
life model should contain a large number of equations. This problem is solved
by the introduction of the large age classes concept. The underlying assumption
is that within a single large age class the individuals do not differ in the de-
mographic parameters (fertility and mortality). Then according to this result,
a more complex model containing different individual strategies is presented.
The methodology of the multipopulation games is used for derivation of two,
mutually equivalent systems of equations. First contains equations describing
the evolution of the strategy frequencies in the whole population completed by
subsystems of equations describing the evolution of the age structure for each
strategy. Second system contains equations describing the changes of general
populations age structure, completed with subsystems of equations describing
the selection of the strategies within each age class.
Introduction
Among the most important approaches to modeling of evolutionary pro-
cesses are life history optimization and evolutionary game theory. The classical
approach to life history theory (Stearns 1992, Roff 1992) relies on optimiza-
tion models. In effect, there are no interactions among individuals or density
dependence:
”Life history evolution usually ignores density and frequency dependence.
The justification is convenience, not logic, or realism” (Stearns 1992)”
On the other hand, in classical game theoretic models there is no age or
stage structure. Payoffs describes the averaged lifetime activity of an individual,
which can be found for example in Cressman 1992:
”...an individual’s strategy is fixed over lifetime or, alternatively, the life
history of an individual is its strategy.”.
The classical approach to evolutionary game theory that can be found in the
textbooks (Maynard Smith 1982, Cressman 1992, Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988
and 1998, Weibull 1995, Nowak 2006) mostly relies on the mathematical struc-
ture of a two-person matrix game. However, during recent years there has been
a huge development in a field, which extends the matrix game paradigm de-
scribing population outcomes of local two-player interactions. There are papers
related to modeling of hierarchy formation (Broom (2002), Broom & Cannings
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(2002)) where more than two individuals are involved in a single interaction
event and density dependent selection (Krivan et al. 2008, Argasinski and
Koz lowski 2008). In addition, there are generalizations of basic evolutionary
game approaches to cases where individuals are characterized by a continuous
trait or a set of continuous traits. Therefore, there is progress in game theoretic
methods to using similar methodology to that of life history theory. The clos-
est approaches are state based games (Houston and McNamara , 1988, 1991,
1992, 1999, Webb et al, 1999, McNamara et al., 1994, McNamara et al, 2004,
McNamara et al., 2009). Another important approach in theoretical evolution-
ary ecology is individual based modeling (multiagent computer simulation tech-
niques). This is a methodology based on the assumption that the individual is
the basic subject of selection and that a model should explicitly consider unique
traits of individuals. The creators of this approach ( Lomnicki 1988, Grimm,
Wyszomirski, Aikman, Uchmanski 2003, Grimm and Railsback, 2005) criticize
classical mathematical models as oversimplified.
Methods used in life history optimization are closely related to classical de-
mographic methods and are expressed in demographic terms. However, how to
construct a general description of the relationships between demographic struc-
ture and population dynamics is still unsolved problem (Caswell 2011). Game
theoretic models operate in abstract terms of costs and benefits measured in
units of fitness mostly without deeper insight in their meaning or interpretation.
This problem was analyzed in Argasinski and Broom (2012) where relationships
between classical demography and evolutionary games are described in detail.
The main conclusion there is that instead of the excess from average fitness,
models should be described explicitly by mortality and fertility, which are ba-
sic opposite forces shaping population dynamics. Those results are sigificant
progress in ecological realism; they emphasize the role of background mortality
and fertility or turnover of individuals (this was originated by Argasinski and
Koz lowski, 2008). However, that approach is still very primitive. Background
mortality is described by a single constant, which describes an exponential de-
cay of the population, which implies that the length of an individuals lifetime
is potentially unbounded, and there is no aging and no age specific payoffs.
The goal of this paper is to fill this gap and develop a mathematical structure
combining selection of individual strategies with an age structured population.
0.1 Classical theory
The classical approach to the modelling of age structured populations is related
to Leslie matrices, followin g the following matrix equation:


n0
n1
...
nm


t+1
=


f0 f1 ... fm
s0 0 0 0
0 ... 0 0
0 0 sm−1 0




n0
n1
...
nm


t
.
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This age-structured growth model suggests a steady-state, or stable, age-
structure and growth rate. The growth rate can be calculated from characteristic
polynomial of the Leslie Matrix called the Euler-Lotka equation:
f0 +
m∑
i=1
e−irfi
i−1∏
j=0
sj = 1,
where r is the intrinsic growth rate of the population. Now let us focus on
populations diversified by individual strategies.
When a population with a finite number of individual strategies is consid-
ered, then a system of differential equations called the replicator dynamics can
be defined. It describes changes of the population state in time and can be
derived in the following way. Assume that we have a finite number I of arbi-
trarily chosen strategies. For each strategy some payoff function ri is assigned
(for example in matrix form, as in the classical Hawk-Dove Game, however the
form of payoff function depends on the modelled problem and can be more com-
plicated). Then the growth of the population of i-strategists can be described
by the Malthusian equation
n˙i = niri. (1)
Then by following a change of coordinates,
qi =
ni
n
(2)
where n =
∑I
i=1 ni is the population size, we can derive a system of ordinary
differential equations (see e.g. Cressman (1992)),
q˙i = qi(ri − r¯) (3)
where r¯ =
∑I
i=1 qiri is the average payoff in the population. However, instead of
the Malthusian parameter describing payoff we can explicitly consider individual
fertility fi and individual mortality di of an i-strategist. In effect we obtain the
following variant of the replicator equations that can be called the sex and
violence equations,
q˙i = qi(fi − f¯ − di + d¯) = qi((fi − f¯)− (di − d¯)), (4)
for details see Argasinski and Broom (2012). It was shown (Argasinski,
2006) that every single population system described by the replicator equations
(3) can be divided into the product of subsystems describing the dynamics in
arbitrary chosen subpopulations (described by a vector of frequencies qi for the i-
th subpopulation) and an additional system describing dynamics of proportions
between those subpopulations p (see appendix A for details). The dynamics in
each subpopulation will have the form (3) and will depend on the excess of the
strategy payoff from the average payoff in this subpopulation. Therefore, the
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same operation can be carried out for equations (4). In effect we obtain the
following system:
q˙ij = q
i
j
((
f ij − f¯
i
)
− (dij − d¯
i)
)
, (5)
p˙s = ps
((
f¯ i − f¯
)
− (d¯i − d¯)
)
, (6)
whereW ij and d
i
j are the fertility and mortality, respectively, of the j- th strategy
in the i- th subpopulation and f¯ i and d¯i are the mean fertility and mortality,
respectively, in the i- th subpopulation and f¯ and d¯ are the respective values
in the global population. When fertility and mortality are density dependent,
the system should be completed by an equation on the population size (scaling
parameter):
n˙ = n(f¯ − d¯). (7)
0.2 A continuous version of the Leslie Matrix
A major technical difference between Leslie matrices and replicator dynamics
is the fact that the first describes discrete system and the second is a system
of continuous differential equations. The Leslie matrix can be presented as a
system of algebraic equations, describing changes of age structure with m age
classess:
n0(t+ 1) = f0n0(t) + f1n1(t)...+ fmnm(t),
...
ni(t+ 1) = si−1ni−1(t),
...
nm(t+ 1) = sm−1nm−1(t).
We can imagine a continuous version of this system:
n˙0 =
∑
nifi − n0,
n˙1 = s0n0 − n1,
...
n˙m = sm−1nm−1 − nm.
(8)
To solve this system we can apply the theory of delayed differential equations
because equation (8) leads to ni(t) = n0(t − iτ)s0s1s2...si−1 where τ is the
respective time interval. This will lead to Euler-Lotka equation for continuous
system. However we will use alternative way to do it by application of the
replicator dynamics. What happens when we describe the system in related
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frequencies ai = ni/
∑
j nj and a scaling parameter (see Appendix b)? We
obtain the following system:
a˙i = ai−1si−1 − ai
(
m∑
i=1
ai (fi + si)
)
for i = 1, ...,m, (9)
n˙ = n
(
m∑
i=0
ai (fi + si)− 1
)
, (10)
where a0 = 1−
m∑
i=1
ai and the malthusian parameter is r =
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)−
1. For a detailed derivation see Appendix B. For the system (9) the following
steady state can be calculated:
a1 =
a0s0∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si)
,
a2 =
a0s0s1
(
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
2
,
...
ai =
a0
i−1∏
j=0
sj
(
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
i
,
...
(11)
In addition in state 11 Euler-Lotka eqution is satisfied (for a derivation and
proof, see Appendix C) The above model is the continuous equivalent of the
basic approach related to the Leslie matrices used in life history modelling.
According to this theory natural selection promote strategies which maximize r
(which is the root of the Euler -Lotka equation). However, in the above model
there is no explicit density dependence. It is hard to imagine the unlimited
growth of the population indicated by this model. In addition, the problem
of a universal fitness measure is more complicated when density dependece is
explicitly considered. Thus our model should be develop further.
0.3 The impact of density dependence
To explicitly model density dependence we can apply a selectively neutral mech-
anistic approach from evolutionary games (Argasinski and Koz lowski, 2008; Ar-
gasinski and Broom, 2012) which is related to a modification of the classical
logistic growth (Koz lowski 1980, Kuno 1991, Ginzburg 1992, Gabriel 2005, Hui
2006, Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008). This constitutes the eco-evolutionary
feedback affecting the fitness (Argasinski and Koz lowski, 2008; Zhang and Hui,
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2011; Argasinski and Broom, 2012; Argasinski and Broom, 2013b). This ap-
proach is closer to current developments in the evolutionary theory focused on
the relationship of selection processes with ecological factors (Schoener 2011,
Morris 2011, Pelletier.et al. 2009). In this approach each fecundity should be
multiplied by the logistic supression coefficient
(
1−
n
K
)
describing the survival
of newborns introduced to the environment (where the carrying capacity K is
interpreted as the maximal environmental load, Hui 2006). As was shown in
Argasinski and Broom (2013), at population size equilibrium density depen-
dent growth equation can be expressed in terms of the turnover coefficient (i.e.
the number of newborns per single dead individual during ∆t). If there are
other strategies in the population, this induces a frequency dependent selection
mechanism called the nest site lottery in Argasinski and Broom (2013).
The same reasoning can be applied to the age structured model. The above
model describes a homogenous population divided only by age classes. Thus
according to frequency dependent selection, a corresponding model of this type
should be presented for each strategy present in the population, since frequency
dependence needs information about the state of the whole population. How-
ever, in the case of the nest site lottery mechanism, the value of the turnover
coefficient for the general population is sufficient. Thus our model will be ex-
tended to the density dependent case by the assumption that there are other
strategies in the population (but not explicitly considered in the model) and
their presence affects the dynamics of our model via a phenomenological pa-
rameter describing average turnover coefficient in the general population.
Now, let us calculate the turnover coefficient describing the number of new-
borns introduced into the population per single dead individual removed from
the population during ∆t. Then F =
∑m
i=0 aifi is the total number of newborns
with the focal strategy introduced to the population and T =
∑m
i=0 ai (1− si)
is the number of dead individuals of the focal strategy removed from the pop-
ulation (Argasinski and Broom, 2013). Assume that the subpopulation of the
carriers of the focal strategy is the part of some general population described
phenomenologically by total population is of size npop and the average turnover
coefficient is Lpop =
Fpop
Tpop
(where Fpop is the total number of newborns and Tpop
is the total number of dead individuals in the whole population during ∆t).
Thus the turnover coefficient for some individual strategy s will be:
L (f(t), s(t)) =
F
T
=
∑m
i=0 aifi∑m
i=0 ai (1− si) ,
(12)
and the equation on the scaling parameter for equation (10) describing the
growth of the population of carriers of this strategy can be presented as
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n˙ = n
((
1−
npop
K
) m∑
i=0
aifi −
m∑
i=0
ai (1− si)
)
(13)
= n
m∑
i=0
ai (1− si)


(
1−
npop
K
)∑m
i=0 aifi∑m
i=0 ai (1− si)
− 1

 (14)
= n
(
L (f(t), s(t))
(
1−
npop
K
)
− 1
) m∑
i=0
ai (1− si) (15)
However, here we have an age structured population. When we assume that
the population is at the stable age structure, then the turnover coefficient has
the form:
L (f(t), s(t)) =
∑m
i=0
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi (1 + r)
m−i
∑m
i=0
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i
(1− si)
(16)
and the growth equation can be presented as follows (see Appendix D for a
detailed derivation):
n˙ = na0
(
L (f(t), s(t))
(
1−
npop
K
)
− 1
) m∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
si
(1 + r)
i
(1− si) . (17)
It was shown in (Argasinski and Broom 2013) that when the population
reaches a stable size then frequency dependent selection emerges on individ-
ual strategies. This is the nest site lottery mechanism (Argasinski and Broom
2013) related to the turnover of individuals. Each newborn introduced to the
environment should find a nesting place. At the population equilibrium size all
newborns produced by all strategies compete for free places released by dead
adult individuals. In effect each newborn can be drawn from the pool of candi-
dates with probability F/Fpop to replace a dead adult and during time∆t there
will be T trials. Thus survival probability of a single newborn equals the num-
ber of all dead individuals during time ∆t (in the number of free places) divided
by number of newborns introduced (number of candidates) i.e. which becomes
the reciprocal of the turnover coefficient of the whole population
1
Lpop
. Thus
we have:
n˙ = n0
(
L (fi(t), si(t))
Lpop(t)
− 1
) m∑
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
si
(1 + r)
i
(1− si) . (18)
Thus for an L-maximizing strategy it is profitable to maximize T =
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
si
(1 + r)
i
(1− si).
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Note that for r = 0 L reduces to the lifetime reproduction
∑m
i=0
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi,
because
∑m
i=0
i∏
j=0
sj = 1. The structure from (Argasinski and Broom 2013)
works and juvenile mortality will be 1/L
(
f˜(t), s˜(t)
)
. However, at (Argasinski
and Broom 2013) strategies are constant two-dimensional vectors, while here
we have age depended fecundity and survival. Thus the turnover coefficient
depends on the age structure of the carrier population of the respective strategy.
Arguments of L (f(t), s(t)) are sums or integrals
∑m
i=0 aifi and
∑m
i=0 aisi but
the nest site lottery works in the same way. Thus at first stage the turnover
coefficient
L (f(t), s(t)) =
∑m
i=0
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi (1 + r)
m−i
∑m
i=0
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i (1− si)
(19)
should be maximized. Subsequently, among L-maximizers
T =
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
si (1 + r)
−i
(1− si)
should be maximized. Note that younger age classes gave greater weight
(1 + r)
m−i
for L and (1 + r)
−i
for T . The average lifetime is∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1− si) i,
and so increase in T will lead to decrease in the average lifetime.
To use the nest site lottery mechanism, we need information about the
turnover coefficient of the whole population Lpop, in this section assumed phe-
nomenologically. To provide this information we need the model of the age
structure of each strategy in the population. In effect the model will be ex-
tremely complicated. However, even the age structured model of the homoge-
nous population is too complicated to be practical. Every time moment ∆t in
the lifetime of the individual should be described by a separate equation. A
realistic model would contain hundreds or thousands of equations. This should
be simplified before diversity among strategies is introduced into our framework.
This is the task for the next section.
1 The behavioural and demographic timescales
In game theoretic models there is a distinction between behavioural and evo-
lutionary timescales (Vincent and Brown 2005, Krivan and Cressman 2009).
There is the possible situation when the behavioural process operates on a differ-
ent timescale to life history (demographic) dynamics. Generally, we can assume
that demographic dynamics is shaped by aggregated outcomes of interaction
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events that occur on the behavioural timescale. For example during a few days
individual interactions may cause the population to significantly change, while
differences between different age classes may be measured in years. During the
time period referred to as an age class, an individual can perform several mat-
ing events and other activities with a mortality risk. For technical reasons we
shall define “age class” as a long time period divided into small age sub-classes
operating in the behavioural time-scale when an interaction may occur. Assume
that probabilities of death and reproduction are constant during long age class,
which are sub-divided into small age sub-classes where individuals do not differ
in payoffs. Under this assumption we can significantly reduce the number of
equations by considering only the large age classes, with Nv = ng + ... + nk,
where small age class g is the first, and small age class k is the last, of the
sub-classes of larger age class v. We can assume that all small age classes inside
long age class are in equilibrium (11). In effect system (8) has the form (for a
detailed derivation see Appendix E):
N˙0 = N0
(∑
i
Ni
N0
fi − (1− s0)−D (s0)
)
, (20)
N˙v = Nv
(
Nv−1
Nv
D (sv−1)− (1− sv)−D (sv)
)
, (21)
where
D (sv) =
sk−gv
k−g∑
i=1
si−1v (
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
k−g−i
describes the fraction of individuals passing to the next large age class (hv is
the number of small age classes within the v-th long age class, i.e. its “length”).
1.1 Frequency dynamics for large age classes
Now we can transform system (21) to the related frequenciesAi =
Ni
N
. Obtained
system will be analogous to (9,10), but described in coordinates Ai instead of
ai. All parameters of the system, such growth r should be described in the
new coordinates. Thus, when we average malthusian coefficients from equations
(20,21) we obtain r =
∑m
i=1Ai (fi + si)−D(sm)− 1, which is equivalent to the
r from the previous section (D(sm) describes dying survivors of the last m-th
age class). In effect we obtain:
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A˙i = Ai
(
Ai−1
Ai
D (si−1)− (1− si)−D (si)−
m∑
i=1
Ai (fi + si) +D(sm) + 1
)
=(22)
= Ai−1D (si−1) +Ai
[
si −D (si)−
m∑
i=1
Ai (fi + si) +D(sm)
]
. (23)
Analogously to equations (9) we have A0 =
∑m
i=1Ai and equation on scaling
parameter:
N˙ = N
(
m∑
i=1
Ai (fi + si)−D(sm)− 1
)
. (24)
Equilibrium of this system should satisfy the following condition:
Ai =
Ai−1D (si−1)
D (si) + di + r
=
Ai−1D (si−1)
D (si)− si +
∑m
i=1 Ai (fi + si)−D(sm)
(25)
which can be presented in the form:
Ai =
A0
i−1∏
z=0
D (sz)
i∏
z=1
[D (sz)− sz +
∑m
z=1Az (fz + sz) +D(sm)]
. (26)
Since the sum of the Ai terms equals 1, we have:
A0 =
1
1 +
∑m
z=1
i−1∏
z=0
D (sz)
i∏
z=1
[D (sz)− sz −
∑m
z=1 Az (fz + sz) +D(sm)]
. (27)
1.2 Extension to multipopulation replicator dynamics
Now we can incorporate the above model into a multipopulation evolutionary
game (see Appendix A for details of the applied methods). Assune that we
have w strategies and m+ 1 age classes indexed from 0 to m. Assume that the
upper index describes the number of age class and the lower index describes
the number of the strategy, p describes the strategy (phenotype) fraction and a
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describes the related size of the age class. Thus, f ij and s
i
j describe, respectively,
the fertility and survival of the j-strategist in age class i. Two perspectives are
possible (see fig 1):
a) First problem is the impact of the age structure in subppopulations
strategically homogenous on selection of the strategies. It can be described
by coordinates:
A0x, ..., A
m
x for x = 1, ...,m the age structure of the x-strategists
subpopulation,
p1, ...., pw the strategy frequencies in the whole population
b) The second approach is focused on how strategic selection within each
age class affects the age structure of the overall population. It can be described
by coordinates:
px1 , ...., p
x
w for x = 1, ...,m strategy frequencies in age class x,
A1, ..., Am the age structure of the population
Now we describe the transition of coordinates between both formulations.
First we should define the auxiliary canonical metasimplex coordinates (see
appendix A which is a single simplex without division into subclasses):
qxi = Aip
x
i = piA
x
i .
Now according to the Appendix A we can define transitions between the two
systems:
a to b:
px = [px1 , ..., p
x
w] =
[
Ax1p1∑w
z=1A
x
zpz
, ...,
Axwpw∑w
z=1A
x
zpz
]
(28)
A =
[
m∑
z=1
A0zpz, ...,
m∑
z=1
Amz pz
]
, (29)
and b to a:
Ax =
[
A1x, ..., A
m
x
]
=
[
A0p0x∑m
z=0A
zpzx
, ...,
Ampmx∑m
z=0A
zpzx
]
(30)
p =
[
m∑
z=0
Azpz1, ...,
m∑
z=0
Azpzw
]
. (31)
Now let us derive systems of equations operating in both coordinates.
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For system a (see Appendix F for detailed derivation):
A˙ij = A
i−1
j D
(
si−1j
)
+Aij
[
sij −D
(
sij
)
−
(
f¯j
(
1−
N
K
)
+ s¯j −D(s
m
j )
)]
,(32)
p˙j = pj
((
f¯j − f¯
)(
1−
N
K
)
+ (s¯j − s¯)− (A
m
j D(s
m
j )− D¯
m
global)
)
, or(33)
p˙j = pj
((
f¯j − f¯
)(
1−
N
K
)
− (d¯j − d¯)− (A
m
j D(s
m
j )− D¯
m
global)
)
, (34)
and the equation on the scaling parameter
N˙ = N
(
f¯
(
1−
N
K
)
+ s¯− D¯mglobal − 1
)
, (35)
where f¯j =
∑m
i=1A
i
jf
i
j , f¯ =
∑w
j=1 pj f¯j , s¯j =
∑m
i=1A
i
js
i
j ,
s¯ =
∑w
i=1 pis¯i, D¯
m
global =
∑w
j=1 pjA
m
j D(s
m
j ).
For system b (see Appendix G for a detailed derivation):
p˙0j =
1
A0
(∑
i
Aipijf
i
j − p
0
j
∑
i
Ai
∑
v
pivf
i
v
)(
1−
N
K
)
+ (36)
+p0j
[(
s0j − s¯
0
)
−
(
D(s0j)− D¯
0
)]
,
p˙ij =
Ai−1
Ai
(
pi−1j D(s
i−1
j )− p
i
jD¯
i−1
)
+ pij
[
(sij − s¯
i)−
(
D(sij)− D¯
i
)]
,(37)
A˙i = Ai−1D¯i−1 +Ai
[
s¯i − D¯i −
(
s¯+ f¯
(
1−
N
K
)
− D¯mglobal
)]
, (38)
and the equation on the scaling parameter
N˙ = N
(
f¯
(
1−
N
K
)
+ s¯− D¯mglobal − 1
)
(39)
where
Dˇi−1 =
∑w
j=1 p
i
jD
(
si−1j
)
D¯i =
∑w
v=1 p
i
vD
(
siv
)
D¯mglobal = A
mD¯m
s¯i =
∑w
v=1 p
i
vs
i
v s¯ =
∑m
v=1A
v s¯v
f¯ i =
∑w
v=1 p
i
vf
i
v f¯ =
∑m
v=1A
v f¯v.
Note that D¯i is the average number of survivors of the i-th age class per
single i aged individual, while D¯mglobal is the average number of individuals that
survived the last,m-th age class (and will die afterwards) per single individual in
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the whole population. Both systems have the same equation on scaling param-
eter which is equivalent to (24). In effect in both cases equilibrium population
size is:
1−
N
K
=
1 + D¯mglobal − s¯
f¯
N = K
(
1−
1 + D¯mglobal − s¯
f¯
)
1.3 Background fitness and neutral density dependence
In this section let us consider the selective neutral (i.e. the same for all strategies
) factors and their impact on the dynamics. One of such factors is the neutral
density dependence (Argasinski Koz lowski 2008, Argasinski Broom 2012, Ar-
gasinski Broom 2013a, Argasinski Broom 2013b). According to this approach
we can assume that each newborn should find a nest site to live and reproduce.
The probability of finding a nest site (in effect newborn survival probability) is
proportional to the fraction of free places and can be described by logistic su-
pression coefficient
(
1−
N
K
)
, where K is the carrying capacity (number of nest
places). Thus each newborn can survive with probability
(
1−
N
K
)
. Therefore
every fecundity should be multiplied by
(
1−
N
K
)
. The case of background fer-
tility and mortality is more complicated. In (Argasinski Broom 2013b) a more
realistic approach to the background fitness (fertility and mortality caused by
other events than the game interactions). It relies on the assumption that some
number of newborns can be produced and some number of adults can be killed
during other activities (i.e. background events). We can assume that there is
a background fertility and mortality acting at the same rate for all individuals,
in this case those factors will appear only in the equation on scaling parameter.
Assumption that there are factors acting in the same way on the individual in
the every age is biologically unrealistic. It is more realistic to assume that out-
comes of the background events should be the same for all strategies, but they
should be different for different age classes. Thus we can assume that within
each age class there is background fertility Φi
(
1−
N
K
)
and background mor-
tality Ψi . According to the equations (4,5,6) each additive factor included to
the growth equation (1), in replicator equations (3) will appear as the bracketed
term describing the excess of the value of this factor from the averaged value
of that factor in the population. Respectively, after division of the population
into subpopulations, the intraspecific dynamics will contain the bracketed term
describing the the excess of the factor value r from the averaged factor valuer
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in that subpopulation (see 5) ,while dynamics of the subpopulation relative size
will contain term describing the excess of the avereage factor value in the re-
spective subpopulation from the average factor value in whole population (6).
Thus according to these relations we can derive the terms describing the impact
of the factor Φi −Ψi ,i.e. age specific background fertility and mortality on the
dynamics.
Let us begin from the system a:
N˙0 = N0
(∑
i
Ni
N0
fi − (1− s0)−D (s0)
)
N˙v = Nv
(
Nv−1
Nv
D (sv−1)− (1− sv)−D (sv)
)
In subsystem (32) there are no equation on the age class A0j which is influ-
enced by aggregated fertility
∑m
i=1 A
i
jΦ
i, thus additional term will be
−Ψi −
m∑
i=1
Aij
(
Φi −Ψi
)
= −Ψi −
(
m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i −
m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i
)
(40)
In subsystem (33)
m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i −
m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i −
∑
j
pj
(
m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i −
m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i
)
(41)
=

 m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i −
∑
j
pj
m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i

−

 m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i −
w∑
j=1
pj
m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i

(42)
and in equation on scaling parameter (35)
∑
j
pj
(
m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i −
m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i
)
(43)
In the case of system b.
For equations (36) individual background fitness can be described as average
per capita number of introduced newborns
Nj
N0j
∑m
i=1A
i
jΦ
i
per single newborn present in the age class 0, and specific newborn back-
ground mortality Ψ0. Since according to (30)
Nj
N0j
=
1
A0j
=
∑m
z=0A
zpzj
A0p0j
and per
capita number of newborns will be:
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Nj
N0j
m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i (44)
=
m∑
i=1
Aipij
A0p0j
Φi (45)
the bracketed term for equations (36) will be
m∑
i=1
Aipij
A0p0j
Φi −Ψ0 −
w∑
k=1
p0k
(
m∑
i=1
Aipik
A0p0k
Φi −Ψ0
)
(46)
=
m∑
i=1
Aipij
A0p0j
Φi −
w∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
Aipik
A0
Φi (47)
Respectively for equations (37) there are no direct impact of fertility and we
have specific age dependent mortality Ψi the same for all strategies, thus it is
selectively neutral (the bracketed term is 0). For equations (38) we have impact
of aggregated fertility only in newborns age class 0 and in the next age classes
acts only specific age dependent mortality Ψi. Since class 0 is not explicitly
described in the subsystem (38), the bracketed term will be:
Ψi −
(
A0
w∑
k=1
p0k
(
m∑
i=1
Aipik
A0p0k
Φi −Ψ0
)
−
m∑
i=1
AiΨi
)
(48)
= Ψi −
(
w∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
AipikΦ
i −
m∑
i=0
AiΨi
)
(49)
= Ψi −
(
m∑
i=1
AiΦi −
m∑
i=0
AiΨi
)
(50)
In equation on scaling parameter (39) should be added:
m∑
i=1
AiΦi −
m∑
i=0
AiΨi (51)
To consider the neutral density dependence fertility factors Φi should be
multiplied by logistic coefficient
(
1−
N
K
)
.
But in the equations we have also operator D. Another decay chanel driven
by background mortality pressure should be represented in the argument of
D. Thus we should calculate the per capita fraction of survivors introduced
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to the next short age class. The problem is that in this case we have two
types of mortality operating at different rates, thus we cannot reduce this to
the simple substraction from 1. Let us consider a simplified equation containing
only mortality components n˙ = n [τ1 (1− s) + τ1(1− b))]
Thus we can use first order Taylor expansion to derive approximation of the
fraction of survivors passing to the next age class:
n(t0 +∆t) = n(t0) + n˙(t0)∆t = n(t0)− n(t0) [τ1 (1− s) + τ1(1− b))]∆t
= n(t0)
(
1−
[(
1− si) +
τ2
τ1
(1− b)
)]
τ1∆t
)
.
When τ1∆t is set to 1 by change of the timescale t˜ = t/τ1l, then we obtain:
n(t0 +∆t) = n(t0)
(
1−
[(
1− si) +
τ2
τ1
(1− b2)
)])
And fraction of survivors can be approximated by si−Ψ
i where Ψ =
τ2
τ1
(1−
b2)
After insertion of the terms (40, 42. 43) system a will have form:
system a:
A˙ij = A
i−1
j D
(
si−1j −Ψ
i
)
+Aij
[
sij −Ψ
i −D
(
sij −Ψ
i
)
−
(
m∑
i=1
Aij
(
f ij
(
1−
N
K
)
+ sij
)
−D(smj −Ψ
i)
)
−
((
1−
N
K
) m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i −
m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i
)]
(52)
p˙j = pj



(f¯j − f¯)+

 m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i −
∑
j
pj
m∑
i=1
AijΦ
i



(1− N
K
)
+(s¯j − s¯)− (A
m
j D(s
m
j −Ψ
m)− D¯mglobal)−

 m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i −
w∑
j=1
pj
m∑
i=1
AijΨ
i




(53)
and equation on scaling parameter
N˙ = N
∑w
j=1 pj
(∑m
i=1 A
i
j
(
f ij
(
1−
N
K
)
+ sij
)
−Amj D(s
m
j −Ψ
m)− 1
+
∑
j pj
((
1−
N
K
)∑m
i=1A
i
jΦ
i −
∑m
i=1 A
i
jΨ
i
))
=
N
(
f¯
(
1−
N
K
)
+ s¯− D¯mglobal − 1 +
∑
j pj
((
1−
N
K
)∑m
i=1A
i
jΦ
i −
∑m
i=1 A
i
jΨ
i
))
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system b:
For system b (see appendix F for detailed derivation):
p˙0j =
1
A0
[(∑
i
Aipijf
i
j − p
0
j
∑
i
Ai
∑
v
pivf
i
v
)
+
(
m∑
i=1
AipijΦ
i − p0j
m∑
i=1
Ai
w∑
k=1
pikΦ
i
)]
(
1−
N
K
)
+ p0j
(
s0j − s¯
0
)
+
(
D(s0j)− D¯
0
)
(54)
p˙ij =
Ai−1
Ai
(
pi−1j D(s
i−1
j −Ψ
i−1)− pijD¯
i−1
)
+ pij
[
(sij − s¯
i) +
(
D(sij −Ψ
i−1)− D¯i
)]
(55)
A˙i = Ai−1D¯i−1 +
Ai
[(
s¯i − D¯i −
(
s¯+ f¯
(
1−
N
K
)
−AmD¯m
))
−
(
Ψi −
(
m∑
i=1
AiΦi
(
1−
N
K
)
−
m∑
i=0
AiΨi
))]
(56)
bo indeksowane od 1 to nie ma zerowej klasy i fertility per capita
and equation on scaling parameter
N˙ = N
(
f¯ + s¯− D¯mglobal − 1 +
∑m
i=1A
iΦi
(
1−
N
K
)
−
∑m
i=0A
iΨi
)
1.3.1 Discussion
In this work was presented a new modelling framework combining evolutionary
dynamics with demographic structure. This approach can be useful tool in
the development of the synthesis between evolutionary game theory and life
history theory. The obtained results clearly show that life cycle perspective
plays crucial role in the evolutionary processes. In the classical approaches to
the evolutionary game theory individuals cannot change the properties during
the lifetime. Thus their life history is the memoryless process, survival of the
single interaction does not change the state of the individual. This is caused by
the fact that the classical approaches to the evolutionary games are focused on
the strategies interpreted as the patterns of behaviour, not on individuals itself.
The exception from this rule is the state based approach (Houston McNamara
1999). The new approach presented in this paper is the natural background for
the dynamic extension of the state based approach.
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Appendix A Change of coordinates in the space of population states.
Assume that we want to decompose an entire population into z subgroups.
Define
di = [di1, ..., d
i
ui
]
as a vector of indexes of strategies exhibited by individuals from i-th sub-
group (dij ∈ {1, ..., u}, ui number of strategies in the i-th subgroup). For exam-
ple notation d2 = [1, 3, 5] means, that in second subgroup there are individuals
with strategies 1, 3 and 5. Every strategy should belong to a single unique sub-
group (and cannot belong to two). Then according to Argasinski (2006), by the
following change of coordinates:
qi = [qi1, ..., q
i
ui
] =
[
qdi
1∑ui
j=1 qdij
, ...,
qdiui∑ui
j=1 qdij
]
for i = 1, ..., z
we obtain distribution of relative frequencies of strategies in the i-th sub-
population. Distribution of proportions between subpopulations has the form:
p = [p1, ..., pz] =
[∑u1
i=1 qd1i , ...,
∑uz
i=1 qdzi
]
where pi is the proportion of the i-th subpopulation. Every decomposition
into subpopulations can be reduced again to a single population model by the
opposite change of coordinates q(p, q1, ..., qz) where:
qdi
j
= piq
i
j
Note that we can decompose an entire population to z subpopulations.
When we apply the above transformations to replicator equations, we obtain
a set of equations that describes dynamics inside subpopulations (intraspecific
dynamics). Because the argument of a fitness function is a set of relative fre-
quencies of all individuals q (without division to subpopulations), the opposite
change of coordinates q(p, q1, ..., qz) should be applied (Argasinski 2006). When
the set of strategies in each subpopulation is characterized by vector of indexes
di, then the system of replicator equations will be:
q˙ij = q
i
j
[
W ij (q(p, q
1, ..., qz))− W¯ i(q(p, q1, ..., qz))
]
(57)
for j = 1, ..., ui − 1 and i = 1, ..., z
p˙s = ps
[
W¯ s(q(p, q1, ..., qz))− W¯ (q(p, q1, ..., qz))
]
for s = 1, ..., z − 1 (58)
where W¯ s(q) =
∑us
i=1 q
s
iW
s
i (q(p, q
1, ..., qz)) is mean fitness in the s-th sub-
population. In simplified notation this system has form (5,6) In practical appli-
cations of this method to modeling of biological problems, replicator equations
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can be defined on decomposed population. This will simplify the formulation of
the model, because when strategies are initially assigned to subpopulations, then
there is no need to change their indexes. Choice of subpopulations is arbitrary
and depends on the biological assumptions underlying the analyzed problem.
The entire population may be divided into two competing subpopulations of
hosts and parasites or preys and predators. On the other hand, it may be di-
vided into two subpopulations of males and females, then interspecific dynamics
will describe the evolution of secondary sex ratio, and intraspecific dynamics will
describe changes of frequencies of strategies inside male and female subpopu-
lation. The entire population can be divided into more subpopulations than
two. The subpopulations can be divided into subsubpopulations, and the en-
tire population may be transformed into a complex multilevel cluster structure.
However, all these structures are equivalent to a single population replicator
dynamics model.
Appendix B Derivation of frequency equations
Initial system 8 can be presented in the form of malthusian equations:
n˙0 =
∑
nifi − n0 = n0
(∑m
i=0
nifi
n0
− 1
)
n˙1 = s0n0 − n1 = n1
(
n0s0
n1
− 1
)
...
n˙m = sm−1nm−1 − nm = nm
(
nm−1sm−1
nm
− 1
)
therefore Malthusian growth coefficients Mi =
nm−1sm−1
nm
−1 of those equa-
tions can be presented as frequency dependent functions of age structure, where
ai =
ni
n
where (n =
∑
i ni) are frequencies among age classes. In effect we
obtain:
n˙0 = n0
(∑m
i=0
aifi
a0
− 1
)
...
n˙i = ni
(
ai−1si−1
ai
− 1
)
...
n˙m = nm
(
am−1sm−1
am
− 1
)
therefore, this system can be presented as system of frequency dependent
replicator equations a˙i = ai(Mi− r) and a single equation on scaling parameter
n˙ = nr. what we need is an average malthusian growth rate:
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r = a0
(∑m
i=0
aifi
a0
− 1
)
+
∑m
i=1 ai
(
ai−1si−1
ai
− 1
)
=
=
∑m
i=0 aifi − a0 +
∑m
i=1 (ai−1si−1 − ai)
=
∑m
i=0 aifi+
∑m
i=1 ai−1si−1−1 =
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si)−1
therefore we can formulate system of frequency dependent replicator equa-
tions by transforming eq. from 1 to m:
a˙i = ai
(
ai−1si−1
ai
−
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)
)
= ai−1si−1 − ai (
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
where a0 = 1−
m∑
i=1
ai and equation on scaling parameter:
n˙ = nr = n (
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)− 1)
Appendix C Stationary age distribution and Euler-Lotka
equation in the continuous case
Stationary points of this system are:
-for age structure:
ai−1si−1
ai
=
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si) for i to m− 1
therefore
ai =
ai−1si−1∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)
which implies:
a1 =
a0s0∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)
a2 =
a0s0s1
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
2
...
ai =
a0
i−1∏
j=0
sj
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
and
∑
i ai = 1 implies
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a0

1 + s0∑mi=1 ai (fi + si) +
s0s1
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
2
+ ...+
i−1∏
j=0
sj
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
+ ...

 =
1 (this is similar to Euler-Lotka equation)
thus:
a0 =
1
1 +
s0∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)
+
s0s1
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
2
+ ...+
i−1∏
j=0
sj
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
+ ...
therefore stable age structure is unique vector of frequencies among age
classes, conditional on average malthusian growth rate of the population. Now
let us proof the equivalence with Euler-Lotka equation. After substitution of
stable age frequencies to n˙0 = n0
(∑m
i=0
aifi
a0
− 1
)
equation we obtain:
n˙0 = n0
(∑m
i=0
aifi
a0
− 1
)
=
= n0

 1a0

a0f0 + s0a0f1∑mi=1 ai (fi + si) +
s0s1a0f2
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
2
+ ...+
i−1∏
j=0
sja0fi
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
+ ...

− 1

 =
= n0

f0 + s0f1∑mi=1 ai (fi + si) +
s0s1f2
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
2
+ ...+
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
+ ...− 1


frequency equilibrium implies that growth rates in all age classes are equal
to the average growth rate A¯ =
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)− 1, which implies:
f0 +
s0f1∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)
+
s0s1f2
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
2
+ ...+
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
+...− 1 =
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)− 1
then
f0∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)
+
s0f1
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
2
+
s0s1f2
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
3
+...+
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i+1
+ ... = 1
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this is Euler-Lotka equation
Appendix D Impact of density dependence on the dynamics
After substitution of the stationary age structure to the formula for turnover
coefficient we have (note that 1 + r =
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si)):
L (f(t), s(t)) =
∑m
i=0
a0
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
∑m
i=0
a0
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1− si)
(
∑m
i=1 ai (fi + si))
i
=
∑m
i=0 a0
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi (1 + r)
m−i
(1 + r)
m
∑m
i=0 a0
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i
(1− si)
(1 + r)m
=
∑m
i=0
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi (1 + r)
m−i
∑m
i=0
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i (1− si)
Analogously we can substitute the stable age structure to the growth equa-
tion (for simplicity without logistic suppresion coefficient):
n˙ = n

∑mi=1
a0
i−1∏
j=0
sj (fi + si − 1)
(1 + r)i

 = n


∑m
i=1
(
a0
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i
(fi + si − 1)
)
(1 + r)
m

 =
na0
(1 + r)
m
(∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi (1 + r)
m−i +
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i si −
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i
)
=
na0
(1 + r)m
(∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi (1 + r)
m−i
−
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i
(1− si)
)
=
for simplicity denote F =
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sjfi (1 + r)
m−i
and averaged per capita
mortality as T =
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i
(1− si) in effect above equation have
form:
n˙ =
na0
(1 + r)
m (F − T ) =
na0
(1 + r)
mT
(
F
T
− 1
)
=
na0
(1 + r)
mT (L (f(t), s(t))− 1)
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because L (f(t), s(t)) =
F
T
, when we remove the auxiliary notation and add
the logistic suppression
(
1−
npop
K
)
describing density dependent survival of the
newborns, we have:
n˙ = na0
∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
m−i
(1− si)
(1 + r)m
(
L (f(t), s(t))
(
1−
npop
K
)
− 1
)
= na0
(
L (f(t), s(t))
(
1−
npop
K
)
− 1
)∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
sj (1 + r)
−i
(1− si)
when we introduce the nest site lottery by assuming that population is in
the equilibrium size, we obtain:
n˙ = na0
(
L
Lpop
− 1
)∑m
i=1
i−1∏
j=0
si
(1 + r)
i
(1− si)
Appendix E Long age classes
Assume that there are some number of small age classes where individuals did
not differ in payoffs. Under this assumption we can significantly reduce number
of age classes by substituting them by large age classes Nv = ng + ...+ nk
N˙v = (ng + ...+ nk)
, = n˙g+1 + n˙g+2 + n˙g+3 + ...+ n˙m =
=
k∑
i=g
(si−1ni−1 − ni) = sv−1ng−1 − (1− sv)
k−1∑
i=g
ni − nk
= sv−1ng−1 − (1− sv)
k∑
i=g
ni − svnk
Therefore system can be presented in the form:
N˙0 =
∑
i
Nifi − (1− s0)N0 − s0nk (59)
N˙v = sv−1ng−1 − (1− sv)Nv − svnk (60)
Now we can assume that inside of large age class system is in equilibrium
(11) and simplify. Because ai =
ni
n
and that survivals sv are the same inside
each long age class, we have
nk =
ngs
k−g−1
v
(
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
k−g
(61)
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Now we can substitute small age class notation with long age classes. Be-
cause:from (61) we have
Nv = ng + ...+ nk = ng
k−g∑
i=1
si−1v
(
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
i
(62)
thus
ng =
Nv
k−g∑
i=1
si−1v
(
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
i
(63)
which substituted to (61) leads to:
svnk =
Nv
k−g∑
i=1
si−1v
(
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
i
sk−gv
(
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
k−g
= Nv
sk−gv
k−g∑
i=1
si−1v (
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
k−g−i
(64)
Thus coefficient D (sv) =
sk−gv
k−g∑
i=1
si−1v (
∑m
i=0 ai (fi + si))
k−g−i
describes frac-
tion of individuals passing to next large age class. In effect equation (60) can
be presented the form:
N˙v = Nv−1D (sv−1)−Nv (1− sv)−NvD (sv) = Nv−1D (sv−1)−Nv (1− sv +D (sv))
(65)
where Nv−1D (sv−1) is entering from previous age class, NvD (sv) are sur-
viving to the next age class and Nv (1− sv) die. k− g is the lenght of large age
class and can be substituted by something. Assume that hv = k−g is the lenght
of v-th long age class, i.e. the number of small age classes). After simplification
and transition into Malthusian form we obtain
N˙0 = N0
(∑
i
Ni
N0
fi − (1− s0)−D (s0)
)
N˙v = Nv
(
Nv−1
Nv
D (sv−1)− (1− sv)−D (sv)
)
Appendix F Derivation of system a
We start from the Malthusian sysytem describing exponential in subpopulation
of carriers of the j-th strategy:
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N˙0j = N
0
j
(∑
i
N ij
N0j
f ij −
(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
))
N˙vj = N
v
j
(
Nv−1j
Nvj
D
(
sv−1j
)
−
(
1− svj
)
−D
(
svj
))
According to (23) above system can be transformed into frequency replicator
dynamics of age classes:
A˙ij = A
i−1
j D
(
si−1j
)
+Aij
[
sij −D
(
sij
)
−
∑m
i=1 A
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
+D(smj )
]
Malthusian equation describing growth of subpopulation of j-th strategists
is Nj =
∑
iN
i
j
N˙j = N
0
j
(∑
i
N ij
N0j
f ij −
(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
))
+
∑m
v=1N
v
j
(
Nv−1j
Nvj
D
(
sv−1j
)
−
(
1− svj
)
−D
(
svj
))
=
=
∑
i
N ijf
i
j−N
0
j
[(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
)]
+
∑m
v=1N
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
−
∑m
v=1N
v
j
(
1− svj
)
−∑m
v=1 N
v
j D
(
svj
)
=
=
∑
i
N ijf
i
j −
∑m
v=0 N
v
j
(
1− svj
)
+
∑m
v=1 N
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
−
∑m
v=0 N
v
j D
(
svj
)
=
=
∑
i
N ijf
i
j −
∑m
v=0N
v
j
(
1− svj
)
−Nmj D
(
smj
)
=
= Nj
(∑
i
Aijf
i
j −
∑m
v=0A
v
j
(
1− svj
)
−Amj D
(
smj
))
=
= Nj
(∑
i
Aijf
i
j +
∑m
v=0A
v
j s
v
j −A
m
j D
(
smj
)
− 1
)
and now we can formulate replicator dynamics describing evolution of the
gene pool:
p˙j = pj
(∑
i
Aijf
i
i +
∑m
v=0 A
v
j s
v
j −A
m
j D
(
smj
)
−
∑
z pz
(∑
i
Aizf
i
z +
∑m
v=0A
v
zs
v
z −A
m
z D (s
m
z )
))
=
= pj
((∑
i
Aijf
i
i −
∑
z pz
∑
i
Aizf
i
z
)
+
(∑m
v=0A
v
j s
v
j −
∑
z pz
∑m
v=0A
v
zs
v
z
)
−
−
(
Amj D
(
smj
)
−
∑
z pzA
m
z D (s
m
z )
))
therefore for system a it will have form
A˙ij = A
i−1
j D
(
si−1j
)
+Aij
[
sij −D
(
sij
)
−
(∑m
i=1 A
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
−D(smj )
)]
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p˙j = pj
((
f¯j − f¯
)
+ (s¯j − s¯)− (A
m
j D(s
m
j )−
∑
z pzA
m
z D (s
m
z ))
)
and equation on scaling parameter
N˙ = N
∑w
j=1 pj
(∑m
i=1 A
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
−Amj D(s
m
j )− 1
)
= N
(
f¯ + s¯− D¯mglobal − 1
)
where f¯j =
∑m
i=1A
i
jf
i
j f¯ =
∑w
j=1 pj f¯j s¯j =
∑m
i=1 A
i
js
i
j
s¯ =
∑w
i−1 pis¯j D¯
m
global =
∑w
j=1 pjA
m
j D(s
m
j )
Then to add the neutral density dependence the fertilities should be multi-
plied by logistic suppression coefficient
(
1−
N
K
)
.
Appendix G Derivation of system b
System b produces more complicated form of equations. Again let us start from
malthusian equations:
N˙0j = N
0
j
(∑
i
N ij
N0j
f ii −
(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
))
(66)
N˙vj = N
v
j
(
Nv−1j
Nvj
D
(
sv−1j
)
−
(
1− svj
)
−D
(
svj
))
(67)
Let us derive malthusian equations describing growth of age classes in global
population.Then N i =
∑i
j N
i
j and p
i
j =
N ij
N i
,since N˙ i =
∑i
j N˙
i
j
N˙0 =
∑
j N
0
j
(∑
i
N ij
N0j
f ii −
(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
))
=
∑0
j
(∑
i
N ijf
i
i −N
0
j
(
1− s0j
)
−N0jD
(
s0j
))
=
=
∑
j
∑
iN
i
jf
i
i −
∑0
j N
0
j
(
1− s0j
)
−
∑0
j N
0
jD
(
s0j
)
because
∑
j
∑
iN
i
jf
i
i =
∑
iN
i
∑
j p
i
jf
i
i = N
0
∑
i
N i
N0
∑
j p
i
jf
i
i = N
0
∑
i
Ai
A0
∑
j p
i
jf
i
i
above equation has form:
N˙0 = N0
(∑
i
Ai
A0
∑
j p
i
jf
i
i −
∑0
j p
0
j
(
1− s0j
)
−
∑0
j p
0
jD
(
s0j
))
analogously:
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N˙v =
∑
j N
v
j
(
Nv−1j
Nvj
D
(
sv−1j
)
−
(
1− svj
)
−D
(
svj
))
=
=
∑
j N
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
−
∑
j N
v
j
(
1− svj
)
−
∑
j N
v
j D
(
svj
)
because
∑
j N
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
= Nv−1
∑
j p
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
= Nv
Nv−1
Nv
∑
j p
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
above equation has form:
N˙v = Nv
(
Av−1
Av
∑
j p
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
−
∑
j p
v
j
(
1− svj
)
−
∑
j p
v
jD
(
svj
))
therefore we obtain system:
N˙0 = N0

∑
i
Ai
A0
∑
j
pijf
i
j +
0∑
j
p0js
0
j −
0∑
j
p0jD
(
s0j
)
− 1

 (68)
N˙v = Nv

Av−1
Av
∑
j
pv−1j D
(
sv−1j
)
+
∑
j
pvj s
v
j −
∑
j
pvjD
(
svj
)
− 1

 (69)
for each v
Now we can calculate Malthusian parameter:
M = A0
(∑
i
Ai
A0
∑
j p
i
jf
i
j +
∑0
j p
0
js
0
j − 1−
∑0
j p
0
jD
(
s0j
))
+
+
∑m
i=1 A
i
(
Ai−1
Ai
∑
j p
i−1
j D
(
si−1j
)
+
∑
j p
v
js
v
j − 1−
∑
j p
i
jD
(
sij
))
=
=
∑
iA
i
∑
j p
i
jf
i
j +A
0
∑0
j p
0
js
0
j −A
0 −A0
∑0
j p
0
jD
(
s0j
)
+
+
∑m
i=1 A
i−1
∑
j p
i−1
j D
(
si−1j
)
+
∑m
i=1 A
i
∑
j p
i
js
i
j−
∑m
i=1A
i−
∑m
i=1 A
i
∑
j p
i
jD
(
sij
)
=
=
∑
iA
i
∑
j p
i
jf
i
j −
∑m
i=0A
i
∑
j p
i
j
(
1− sij
)
+
∑m
i=1 A
i−1
∑
j p
i−1
j D
(
si−1j
)
−∑m
i=0 A
i
∑
j p
i
jD
(
sij
)
=
=
∑
iA
i
∑
j p
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
−Am
∑
j p
m
j D
(
smj
)
− 1
Then we can derive replicator dynamics of global population age structure:
Av = Av
(
Av−1
Av
∑
j p
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
−
∑
j p
v
j
(
1− svj
)
−
∑
j p
v
jD
(
svj
)
−
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−
(∑
iA
i
∑
j p
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
−Am
∑
j p
m
j D
(
smj
)
− 1
))
=
= Av−1
∑
j p
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
+
+Av
(∑
j p
v
j s
v
j −
∑
j p
v
jD
(
svj
)
−
∑
iA
i
∑
j p
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
+Am
∑
j p
m
j D
(
smj
))
=
= Av−1
∑
j p
v−1
j D
(
sv−1j
)
+
+Av
(∑
j p
v
j
(
svj −D
(
svj
))
−
(∑
iA
i
∑
j p
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
−Am
∑
j p
m
j D
(
smj
)))
then from malthusian parameters from equations (67) and (69) we can derive
dynamics of proportions of strategies inside age classes:
p˙ij = p
i
j
((
N i−1j
N ij
D
(
si−1j
)
−
(
1− sij
)
−D
(
sij
))
−
∑
j p
i
j
(
N i−1j
N ij
D
(
si−1j
)
−
(
1− sij
)
−D
(
sij
)))
=
because Aipij = N
i
j/N (see appendix A)
= pij
(
Ai−1pi−1j
Aipij
D
(
si−1j
)
−
(
1− sij
)
−D
(
sij
)
−
∑
j
Ai−1pi−1j
Ai
D
(
si−1j
)
+
∑
j p
i
j
(
1− sij
)
+
∑
j p
i
jD
(
sij
))
=
=
Ai−1pi−1j
Ai
D
(
si−1j
)
− pij
∑
j
Ai−1pi−1j
Ai
D
(
si−1j
)
+
pij
[
+
∑
j p
i
j
(
1− sij
)
+
∑
j p
i
jD
(
sij
)
−
(
1− sij
)
−D
(
sij
)]
=
=
Ai−1
Ai
[
pi−1j D
(
si−1j
)
− pij
∑
j p
i−1
j D
(
si−1j
)]
+pij
[(
sij −
∑
j p
i
js
i
j
)
−
(
D
(
sij
)
−
∑
j p
i
jD
(
sij
))]
and
p˙0j = p
0
j
(∑
i
N ij
N0j
f ij −
(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
)
−
∑
v p
0
v
(∑
i
N iv
N0v
f iv −
(
1− s0v
)
−D
(
s0v
)))
p˙0j = p
0
j
(∑
i
Aipij
A0p0j
f ij −
(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
)
−
∑
v p
0
v
(∑
i
Aipiv
A0p0v
f iv −
(
1− s0v
)
−D
(
s0v
)))
p˙0j = p
0
j
(∑
i
Aipij
A0p0j
f ij −
(
1− s0j
)
−D
(
s0j
)
−
∑
v
∑
i
Aipiv
A0
f iv +
∑
v p
0
v
(
1− s0v
)
+
∑
v p
0
vD
(
s0v
))
p˙0j =
(∑
i
Aipij
A0
f ij − p
0
j
∑
v
∑
i
Aipiv
A0
f iv
)
+p0j
[(
s0j −
∑
j p
0
js
0
j
)
−
(
D
(
s0j
)
−
∑
j p
0
jD
(
s0j
))]
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therefore for system b:
p˙0j =
1
A0
(∑
iA
ipijf
i
j − p
0
j
∑
iA
i
∑
v p
i
vf
i
v
)
+
+p0j
[(
s0j −
∑w
i=1 p
0
i s
0
i
)
+
(
D(s0j )−
∑w
j=1 p
0
jD(s
0
j)
)]
p˙ij =
Ai−1
Ai
(
pi−1j D(s
i−1
j )− p
i
j
∑
v p
i−1
v D(s
i−1
v )
)
+
+pij
[
(sij −
∑w
v=1 p
i
vs
i
v)−
(
D(sij)−
∑w
v=1 p
i
vD(s
i
v)
)]
for all j
A˙i = Ai−1
∑w
j=1 p
i
jD
(
si−1j
)
+
+Ai
[∑w
j=1 p
i
j
(
sij −D
(
sij
))
−
(∑m
v=1A
v
∑w
j=1 p
v
j
(
fvj + s
v
j
)
−Am
∑w
j=1 p
m
j D(s
m
j )
)]
and equation on scaling parameter
N˙ = N
(∑m
i=1A
i
∑w
j=1 p
i
j
(
f ij + s
i
j
)
−Am
∑w
j=1 p
m
j D(s
m
j )− 1
)
in simplified form:
p˙0j =
1
A0
(∑
iA
ipijf
i
j − p
0
j
∑
v
∑
iA
ipivf
i
v
)
+ p0j
[(
s0j − s¯
0
)
−
(
D(s0j )− D¯
0
)]
p˙ij =
Ai−1
Ai
(
pi−1j D(s
i−1
j )− p
i
jD¯
i−1
)
+ pij
[
(sij − s¯
i)−
(
D(sij)− D¯
i
)]
A˙i = Ai−1D¯i−1 +Ai
[
s¯i − D¯i −
(
s¯+ f¯ −AmD¯m
)]
and equation on scaling parameter
N˙ = N
(
s¯+ f¯ −AmD¯m − 1
)
where Dˇi−1 =
∑w
j=1 p
i
jD
(
si−1j
)
D¯i =
∑w
v=1 p
i
vD
(
siv
)
s¯i =
∑w
v=1 p
i
vs
i
v
s¯ =
∑m
v=1A
v s¯v f¯ i =
∑w
v=1 p
i
vf
i
v f¯ =
∑m
v=1A
v f¯v
As inthe previous appendix, to add the neutral density dependence the fer-
tilities should be multiplied by logistic suppression coefficient
(
1−
N
K
)
.
30
1.3.2 References:
Argasinski, K. (2006) Dynamic multipopulation and density dependent evolu-
tionary games related to replicator dynamics. A metasimplex concept. Mathe-
matical Biosciences 202, 88–114.
Argasinski, K. and Koz lowski J. (2008) How can we model selectively neutral
density dependence in evolutionary games. Theor Pop Biol 73 250–256.
Argasinski, K. and Broom M. (2012). Ecological theatre and the evolution-
ary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in
evolutionary games. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 1-28.
Argasinski, K. and Broom M. (2013)The nest site lottery: how selectively
neutral density dependent growth suppression induces frequency dependent se-
lection, arXiv:1303.0564 [q-bio.PE]
Argasinski, K. and Broom M. (2013a) Background fitness, eco-evolutionary
feedbacks and the Hawk-Dove game arXiv:1302.7301 [q-bio.PE]
Broom, M. (2002). A unified model of dominance hierarchy formation and
maintenance. Journal of theoretical biology, 219(1), 63-72.
Broom, M., & Cannings, C. (2002). Modelling dominance hierarchy forma-
tion as a multi-player game. Journal of theoretical Biology, 219(3), 397-413.
Caswell H (2011) Beyond R0: Demographic Models for Variability of Life-
time Reproductive Output. PLoS ONE 6(6): e20809. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020809
Cressman R. (1992) The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory.
Springer
Cressman, R. and Garay J. (2004).Stability in N-Species Coevolutionary
Systems. Theor Pop Biol 64 519–533
Geritz S. A. H, Kisdi E, (2011) Mathematical ecology: why mechanistic
models? J Math Biol DOI 10.1007/s00285-011-0496-3
Grimm V, Railsback S (2005). Individual based modelling and ecology,
Princeton University Press
Ginzburg, L.R., 1992. Evolutionary consequences of basic growth equations.
Trends Ecol. Evol. 7, 133.
Gabriel, J.P., Saucy, F., Bersier, L.F., 2005. Paradoxes in the logistic equa-
tion? Ecol. Model. 185, 147–151.
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1988). The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical
Systems. Cambridge University Press
Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dy-
namics. Cambridge University Press
Houston, A, . and J. McNamara (1999). Models of adaptive behaviour.
Cambridge Univ Pr.
Houston, A. and J. McNamara (1988). The ideal free distribution when
competitive abilities differ: an approach based on statistical mechanics. Animal
Behaviour 36 (1), 166-174.
Houston, A. and J. McNamara (1991). Evolutionarily stable strategies in
the repeated hawk-dove game. Behavioral Ecology 2 (3), 219-227.
Hui C 2006 Carrying capacity, population equilibrium, and environment’s
maximal load. Ecol. Model. 192, 1–2, 317–320
31
Koz lowski, J.,1982. Density dependence, the logistic equation, and r- and
K-selection: A critique and an alternative approach. Evolutionary Theory 5,
89-101.
Krivan, V. and R. Cressman (2009). On evolutionary stability in predator-
prey models with fast behavioural dynamics. Evolutionary Ecology Research
11 (2), 227–251.
 Lomnicki A (1988) Population ecology of individuals, Princeton University
Press
McNamara, J., Z. Barta, and A. Houston (2004). Variation in behaviour
promotes cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game. Nature 428, 745-748.
McNamara, J., L. Fromhage, Z. Barta, and A. Houston (2009). The optimal
coyness game. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 276
(1658), 953.
McNamara, J. and A. Houston (1992). Evolutionarily stable levels of vigi-
lance as a function of group size. Animal Behaviour 43, 641-658.
McNamara, J., A. Houston, and S. Lima (1994). Foraging routines of small
birds in winter: a theoretical investigation. Journal of Avian Biology 25 (4),
287-302.
Morris D.W., 2011 Adaptation and habitat selection in the eco-evolutionary
process Proc. R. Soc. B 22 278 1717 2401-2411
Maynard Smith J (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge
University Press
Pelletier F., Garant D., Hendry A.P., 2009, Eco-evolutionary dynamics Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. B 364, 1483-1489
Post D.M. and Palkovacs E.P. 2009. Eco-evolutionary feedbacks in commu-
nity and ecosystem ecology: interactions between the ecological theatre and the
evolutionary play. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 364: 1629-40.
Roff, D.A (1992) The Evolution of Life Histories, Theory and Analyses.
Chapman & Hall
Roff, D.A (2008). Defining fitness in evolutionary models. J Gen 87, 339-
348.
Stearns S.C. (1992) The Evolution of Life Histories. Oxford University Press.
Schoener T.W., 2011, The Newest Synthesis: Understanding the Interplay
of Evolutionary and Ecological Dynamics. Science 331, 426
Uchman´ski J. Grimm V. (1986) Individual-based modelling in ecology: what
makes the difference? TREE, 11, 10, 437-441.
Vincent L.T. Brown J. (2005) Evolutionary Game Theory, Natural Selection,
and Darwinian Dynamics. Cambridge University Press
Weibull, J. (1995) Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press.
Webb, J., A. Houston, J. McNamara, and T. A. Szekely (1999). Multiple
patterns of parental care. Animal behaviour 58 (5), 983-993.
Verhulst, P.F. 1838. Notice sur la loi que la population pursuit dans son
accroissement. Corresp. Math. Phys. 10: 113–121.
Zhang F, Hui C (2011) Eco-Evolutionary Feedback and the Invasion of Coop-
eration in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. PLoS ONE 6(11): e27523. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027523
32
Fig.1 The difference between two alternative formulations of the problem:
system a describes the evolution of the gene pool according to age structures of
carrier subpopulations, system b describes evolution of the global age structure
driven by strategy selection in age classes.
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